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Abstract
Purpose
This study explores the influence of field-level funding pressure and resource dependency on
conflicting institutional logics in implementing a new performance measurement system (PMS)
within a privatised social enterprise (SE) in a developing country. It answers the research question:
how accounting-based key performance indicators (KPIs) were chosen within a privatised SE to
maintain co-existence between two, different institutional logics, the social and commercial logics, 
to gain legitimacy in the government funding scheme.
Design/methodology/approach
This study expands the application and contribution of the Besharov and Smith’s (2014) logics 
multiplicity framework to previous management accounting literature on PMS and institutional
logics. It adds a new dimension to previous literature to theorise the cognitive dynamics of 
institutional logics at three distinct but interrelated institutional levels: field, organisational, and 
individual. Data comes from an interpretive case study of an Egyptian SE, involved in
implementing a social project (drinking water refining) in rural communities.
Findings
PMS acts as a political tool through which the privatised case company has gained societal 
acceptance and legitimacy in the government funding scheme. Its non-political KPIs have turned
into political tools to meet the institutional demands of the funding scheme. This government 
involvement represents field-level institutional logics, which influenced the organisational-level 
interplay of commercial and social logics and then the individual-level choice of internal KPIs.
This contributes to the fact that institutional logics and their interplay between these three levels
are ‘in a state of flux’ within SEs’ internal PMS.
Originality/value
This study deals with a real-life practical case that proves the prevalence of one institutional logic 
over another at both the organisational and individual levels may be occasioned by organisational
field pressures and opportunities rather than by other intra-organisational conflicts as discussed in 
most previous literature on PMS and institutional logics.
Keywords: Social enterprises; Performance measurement system; Government involvement;
institutional logics; Key performance indicators; Egypt
JEL Classification: M41; P27; P31; Q01; Q25; O55







    
     
  
    
     
        
    
      
   
  
      
       
     
       
   
    
   
   
    
    
     
     
     
    
   
     
      
       
    
   
 
      
  
      
  
   
    
      
         
   
     
     
1. Introduction
A SE has two distinct characteristics: adopting a form of commercial activity to generate revenue
and pursuing social goals (Lepori and Montauti, 2020; Busco et al., 2017). SEs are complex
organisations as they combine two different organisational missions. For instance, 
commercialising goods and services to secure the funds necessary to support the social needs of a
specific community. The complex mission of SEs reflects two different institutional logics: the 
commercial logic and the social logic (Nielsen et al., 2019). Institutional logics are a set of socially
constructed assumptions, beliefs, values, and practices that shape the cognition and actions of
people and organisations (Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016), considering adaptive governance to be
determined by the interaction between social systems and human psychology (Kaufman and
Covaleski, 2019). While the commercial logic focuses on operational financial performance, the 
social logic emphasises societal acceptance and legitimacy of the organisation (Busco et al., 2017).
Previous PMS literature has shown that when two or more institutional logics conflict, it becomes
difficult for an organisation to design and implement a comprehensive PMS (Lepori and Montauti, 
2020; Nielsen et al., 2019; Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016; Luke et al., 2013). Dai et al. (2017), for
example, assert that the development of measurement and reporting systems that consider both
social and financial values is an important step for such organisations (such as SEs). Also, conflicts
between multiple and competing logics need not be reduced or reconciled but could be mediated 
through accounting and control practices to generate innovation (Knardal, 2020; Busco et al.,
2017; Gendron, 2002). However, Ebrahim and Rangan (2014) argue that “much of the literature
on the topic of performance in the social sector is under-theorized and in need of conceptual 
framing” (p.119). Although financial operational indicators can be designed using well-established 
metrics from management accounting/PMS literature (Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016; Chenhall and 
Moers, 2015; Chenhall et al. 2013), accounting-based PMS metrics may conflict with the key
assumptions underlying institutional social logics that shape the design and operation process of
societal health improvement assessment indicators in SEs (Nielsen et al., 2019; Busco et al., 2017;
Jenner, 2016). Furthermore, although by combining elements from different logics, management 
accounting/PMS can be employed to reconcile conflict (Ferry and Eckersley, 2020), it is argued
that little is known in the literature on the influence of the institutional field on the interplay of
commercial and social institutional logics and the choice of KPIs during PMS implementation of 
SEs, which combines operational financial performance with social impact indicators (Nielsen et 
al., 2019; Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019; Busco et al., 2017; Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016).
This lack of previous management accounting literature to explore the influence of institutional 
pressures at the field level on SEs’ internal PMS and institutional logics was the motivation for
this study. Most previous studies, reinforced by different theoretical explanations and empirical
methodologies, explore SEs’ internal PMS and institutional logics at both the organisational and 
individual levels, both in developed and developing contexts (Rozenfeld and Scapens, in press;
Knardal, 2020; Ferry and Eckersley, 2020; Manville and Greatbanks, 2020; Kaufman and
Covaleski, 2019; Diab and Metwally, 2019; Busco et al., 2017; Contrafatto and Burns, 2013). 
However, there is still a lack of existing literature and hitherto unexplored linkages on the influence
of institutional forces, at a macro-level, on the creation and use of a PMS, at a micro-level. The
purpose of the present study is to explore if and how macro-level field pressures and opportunities 
influence micro-organisational PMS within a privatised SE in a developing country. It seeks to 






   
   
   
    
  
 
      
     
      
     
     
    
    
    
      
       
      
      
      
     
        
      
    
    
     
     
  
      
    
  
    
    
  
    
     
      
      
      
      
    
 
     
    
      
existence between two different institutional logics, social and commercial, to gain legitimacy in 
the government funding scheme? Given the different institutional environment of the Egyptian
SEs, based on certain funding scheme and government KPIs, this overarching research question is 
split into two sub-questions: how does government involvement through the funding scheme
impact on the interplay of commercial and social logics within privatised SEs? And interestingly, 
how does this resource dependency impact the choice of certain KPIs for their internal PMS?
This study aims to fuel this literature inattention by exploring the influence of government, which 
puts privatised SEs under a certain resource dependency, on the interplay of commercial and social 
logics as well as the choice of KPIs. It seeks to investigate the influence of field-level funding 
pressures on the design and implementation of a PMS in a privatised SE, and its effect on the
mission of the SE, when analysed through the multiple and competing lens of commercial and 
social institutional logics. We argue that the role of management accounting and control in 
sustaining corporate heterogeneity (Busco et al., 2017; Contrafatto and Burns, 2013), and/or
budgetary practices in expressing institutional beliefs (Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019) would not 
be possible without an effective PMS design and implementation, which reflects institutional 
demands at the field level for KPIs. This is important not only because the co-existence of both 
logics must be forged in the enterprise, but also because the social cognitive behaviour of the
enterprise’s management (or part of) may impact the creation of a PMS. Moreover, it is argued 
that the logic of motivationally driven social cognition is applicable, regardless of whether motives
are held only by individuals or are shared in groups within the organisation (Ishaque, 2020,
Manville and Greatbanks, 2020). In a SE context, the motives are the willing in gaining societal 
acceptance and legitimacy at the field level to signify good performance, governance and
compliance with its regulatory body (Mättö et al., 2020; Luke et al., 2013; Nicholls, 2010).
Unlike literature, given the overarching research question, this study uses Besharov and Smith
(2014) institutional logics framework for analysing the influence of field-level government
pressures on PMS implementation in an Egyptian privatised SE. This specific framework,
compared to other institutional logics frameworks (Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; Skelcher and
Smith, 2015; Pache and Santos, 2013), provides a multi-level analysis (Knardal, 2020). It explains 
how field-level institutional forces can influence the organisational and then the individual level, 
which can lead to the causal links between the interplay of commercial and social logics and the 
choice of KPIs within the SE. Researchers have applied Besharov and Smith’s (2014) framework
to analyse if and how conflicting logics at different institutional levels explain the success or failure
of SEs (Knardal, 2020; Nielsen et al., 2019; McMullin and Skelcher, 2018; Dufays and 
Huybrechts, 2016). Some accounting studies have explicitly employed an institutional logics 
approach as an analytical framework (Yee, 2020; Golyagina, 2020; Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019; 
Cherrier et al., 2018; Busco et al., 2017; Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016; Ahrens and Khalifa, 2015;
Schaffer et al., 2015) and used the term ‘logics’ to analyse both the organisational and individual
levels. Other studies have used much more this approach for theorising the social and commercial
tension in the creation of PMS within public or non-profit organisations (Rozenfeld and Scapens, 
in press; Knardal, 2020; Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; Skelcher and Smith, 2015; Pache and 
Santos, 2013).
Our empirical data is from a SE case study in Egypt (given the pseudonym Mauris). Egypt, 
compared to previous literature in developing and developed contexts, has unique institutional






   
        
      
      
        
        




      
         
     
     
     
        
 
       
 
  
   
       
        
    
   
      
   
    
      
    
 
       
         
    
      
       
       
   
   
          
   
    
       
 
funding scheme from the Egyptian government. This government involvement, which puts SEs
under a certain resource dependency, has a major impact on the interplay of commercial and social
logics as well as the choice of KPIs. Mauris’ choice is based on its unique organisational settings
as the main SE providing affordable, safe drinking water facilities for poor rural people, thus
contributing to improving the health quality of the population. This is particularly important
considering the national economy thrives on a healthy population, with safe drinking water
contributing immensely to societal health. Along with its privatisation, Mauris became financially
autonomous but continued to receive government funding through financial incentives calculated 
by KPIs. Therefore, because of the enterprise’s foundation on commercial and social logics, PMS
implementation includes financial operational indicators at the organisational level and societal 
health improvement indicators at the community level. Also, although the degree to which both 
logics are combined may be based on the necessity/importance of one against the other (i.e., not
predefined), we argue that the alignment of the two would be influenced by the social cognition of 
management, in addition to other regulatory requirements (Ahrens and Khalifa, 2015; Schaffer et
al., 2015). This is because decision makers’ attitudes and believes about social reality are bolstered
by information, considering they already have strong goals, motives and preferences (Ishaque, 
2020; Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016).
This study contributes to previous PMS literature with the following findings: first, the dual facet
of logic multiplicity (aligned but estranged) within Mauris indicates the enterprise’s deviation from 
Besharov and Smith’s (2014) framework and sheds light on the difficulties that may be
encountered when applying the theory to the practicalities and specificities of SEs (Nielsen et al., 
2019). Second, the complexity in designing suitable performance measures for social outcomes
demonstrates the challenge in using accounting and control practices to foster the persistence of
the social and commercial logics within the SE (Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019; Busco et al., 2017).
Third, the prevalence of one institutional logic over another at the organisational and individual 
levels may be engendered by field-level government pressures and funding opportunities rather 
than by other intra-organisational conflicts (Kurunmaki and Miller, 2006). Mauris’ management
prioritised commercial logics to secure the financial viability of the organisation, and ensure the
legitimacy of its social status. It is also a guarantee that the company meets its obligations to
various stakeholders in the community (Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019). Fourth, we contend that
conflicts between institutional logics in organisational performance measurement explain the 
complementarity of the dual mission in a privatised SE. The implementation of a PMS is clearly
connected to and plays a more pivotal role in SEs’ institutional complexity than previously
mentioned in previous literature. Such shifting relationships between commercial and social logics
reflect an increasingly complex attitude for SEs’ internal PMS, which now emphasises developing
business-critical activities, instead of simply presenting performance data as a tool to promote
good governance and compliance to their regulatory bodies (Mättö et al., 2020; Manville and
Greatbanks, 2020; Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016). This ends with the fact that institutional logics and
their interplay are ‘in a state of flux’ within SEs’ internal PMS.
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature and frames the 
theoretical framework. Section 3 explains data and methodology. Section 4 analyses the empirical
findings according to the theoretical framework used. Section 5 is a discussion of the theoretical 
debate in conjunction with previous literature on PMS and institutional logics. Lastly, Section 6







   
    
  
 
     
  
   
      
      
      
      
       
  
    
   
  
      
  
   
     
   
   
   
      
 
           
         
      
      
     
     
     
     
    
        
       
   
   
       
     
  
   
2. Literature and theory
2.1 SEs, performance measurement, and institutional logics
Previous PMS literature has addressed the relationship between SEs complexity and conflicting 
institutional logics (Ferry and Eckersley, 2020; Manville and Greatbanks, 2020; Nielsen et al., 
2019; Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019; Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; Busco et al., 2017; Carlsson-
Wall et al., 2016; Gendron, 2002). This literature explains that understanding SEs depends on
regional differences, institutional pressures and contextual settings in which SEs operate. For
instance, while market-based approaches to income generation and social transformation pervade
the SEs discourse in the USA (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010; Nyssens, 2006), in Europe and
developing countries, it is dominated by a cooperative tradition of collective social actions (Diab
and Metwally, 2019; Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). In the UK, the government proposed a
definition of SE as “a business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally
reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the community, rather than being driven by the
need to maximize profit for shareholders and owners” (DTI, 2002, p.13).
SEs are, therefore, distinct from private sector organisations that seek to maximise profits for
shareholders (Jenner, 2016), and from traditional not-for-profit organisations that rely on grants, 
donations and bequests (Nielsen et al., 2019). Concerning the pro-wealth motives, cooperation, 
and community building (Dai et al., 2017), the core goals of SEs comprise reducing poverty,
inequality, homelessness, carbon emissions and unemployment (Gidron, 2017). Some 
management accounting researchers argue that the categorisation as a SE derives from the dual 
mission and institutional complexity to obtain financial gains while creating social value by
merging socially excluded and deprived individuals into the workplace (Knardal, 2020; Nielsen et 
al., 2019; Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019; Dai et al., 2017). Others posit that the institutional 
pressure of commercial activities required for such classification ranges from minimal to total 
reliance on trading income (Rozenfeld and Scapens, in press; Busco et al., 2017; Carlsson-Wall et
al., 2016; Gendron, 2002).
The degree of emergence of SEs is thus affected by various institutional factors and forces at
country level. Because SEs are situated at the intersection of social and commercial sectors, they
bear the pressure to deal with conflicting institutional demands (Gidron, 2017). These demands 
usually comprise the social logic of social value creation, and the commercial logic to attain 
business success (Pache and Santos, 2010). Additionally, in executing the commercial logic, SEs 
face competition posed by other organisations operating in the same environment (Nielsen et al., 
2019; Pache and Santos, 2010). The friction between financial and social logics is the tension 
between managing a business and satisfying idealistic objectives, i.e., the tension between
pragmatism and idealism (Gendron, 2002). In situations of incompatible sets of institutional logics, 
organisations face the problem of competing demands and the risk of incorporating conflicting
practices (Cherrier et al., 2018; Busco et al., 2017) which may favour one group but offend another
(Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016). Therefore, organisations swing 
between a relative emphasis on pragmatism in times of financial challenge and idealism in times 
of financial stability, with the complementarity of this duality as a source of organisational strength
(Lepori and Montauti, 2020; Golyagina, 2020). Therefore, Cherrier et al. (2018) call for research 
on social entrepreneurship and institutional complexity in emerging markets to enhance






      
 
   
 
   
         
  
   
 
     
         
        
     
   




      
      
   
     
     
     
     
  
        
 
   
   
  
      
 
    
   
  
       
      
    
    
        
     
     
      
some cause productive tensions whilst others continuously restrict social entrepreneurial actions
(Diab and Metwally, 2019; Schaffer et al., 2015).
Also, the forms and activities of SEs are shaped by institutional field policies and pressures at the 
national and supra-national levels (Manville and Greatbanks, 2020; Kurunmaki and Miller, 2006). 
For instance, the USA’s Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation issues influential 
policies promoting SEs. The UK Civil Society Office launched the Big Society Initiative (Ferry
and Eckersley, 2020; Jenner, 2016), while the European Union created the Social Business
Initiative to promote the SEs agenda (European Commission, 2011). Considering the forced 
marketisation of the not-for-profit sector has pressured SEs to institutionalise commercial 
strategies that conflict with their core social mission (Dai et al., 2017), these policies and forces
have encouraged the creation and use of new performance measurement forms of SEs. Ferry and
Eckersley (2020) argue that successive UK governments have attempted to influence the SE
discourse in order to facilitate implementation of policy reforms and performance measurement 
systems in the public sector (see also Yee, 2020; Dai et al., 2017; Arena et al., 2015).
Recent PMS literature argue that the SEs complexity creates challenges and opportunities in
conflicting and competing institutional logics (Lepori and Montauti, 2020; Golyagina, 2020; Yee, 
2020; Ferry and Eckersley, 2020; Manville and Greatbanks, 2020; Knardal, 2020; Nielsen et al., 
2019; Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; Busco et al., 2017). First, their dual mission requires managers
to find an equilibrium between the social/welfare rationale (creating social value) and the 
market/commercial rationale (creating shareholder value and corporate profitability) (Gebreiter
and Hidayah, 2019; Dai et al., 2017). This results in tensions from conflicts in determining the
relative priorities of financial goals over social goals (Busco et al., 2017), which may, in turn,
result in a mission drift at the organisational level with potential legitimacy issues at the
stakeholder levels (Nicholls, 2010; Gendron, 2002). These tensions can be resolved through SEs 
by applying trade-offs that include searching for ideal conditions to generate commercial revenue, 
enabling successful social value creation and maintenance (Dai et al., 2017). They could also adopt 
a social mission led strategic direction (Busco et al., 2017), and cede profits so that the balance
between conceptualisation and social value creation is maintained (Nielsen et al., 2019).
Governance process allows the prioritisation of one logic based on environmental conditions 
(Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019) as well as management discretion required to ensure effective
collaboration with other logics (Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019). The continuous process of ensuring 
shared understanding could reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable (environmental, social and
financial) objectives (Manville and Greatbanks, 2020). Thus, contradictory institutional logics 
could be distinctively influenced through governance process that identifies opportunities within
a pluralist environment and implements innovative practices to capitalise on this complexity
(Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019; Busco et al., 2017).
Second, considering other corporate customers may be more profitable than SEs, venture
capitalists and conventional commercial banks are less attractive to the focus on creating social
value (Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019). Because of the complex status of SEs, financiers face
difficulty in categorising them as business organisations (Lepori and Montauti, 2020), thus
creating tensions in prioritising commercial over social goals. The use of dual pricing strategy and 
generation of social return to the detriment of financial return are some trade-offs to resolve the 
tension. Also, obtaining social investment funds, benefiting from mixed funding flows,







    
     
      
    
      
    
   
     
      
    
      
     
    
           
   
     
     
     
  
        
 
  
   
 
      
      
         
 
     
    
      
     
  
   
  
     
  
  
    
    
    
 
equity capital), and using cross-subsidisation business models incorporate tension-resolution 
mechanisms (Nielsen et al., 2019; Gidron, 2017). Based on the extremity of movements in an 
organisation’s external environment, budgetary discretion could provide a mechanism for 
institutional maintenance, enabling a slow evolvement of a decoupled system (Lepori and
Montauti, 2020; Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019). Budgetary discretion could also be a vehicle for
institutional change by which a competing logic gains influence (Lepori and Montauti, 2020; 
Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019). Furthermore, in the face of institutional complexity, the variation 
in management accounting/PMS practices is probably to be determined by multiple logics 
(Knardal, 2020; Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; Busco et al., 2017; Dai et al., 2017).
Third, to reinforce the understanding of human resources management accounting in SEs, 
institutional complexity provides an important trend (Dai et al., 2017). Because financial
constraints result in SEs underpaying employees (Nielsen et al., 2019), their access to skilled
labour is limited. Many SEs rely on the efforts of volunteers and trustees who donate their
knowledge and skills without charge. Although volunteers could provide relevant expertise,
progressive prioritisation of commercial objectives over social goals may result in tensions
between employees and volunteers (Golyagina, 2020; Arena et al., 2015). The result could be a
compromise between investing in the recruitment and training of volunteers, with an undesirable 
effect of reducing funds available for social value creation, and using high salaries to attract skilled
labour (Nielsen et al., 2019; Busco et al., 2017). Thus, in conditions of institutional complexity,
developing innovative and creative strategies involves a continual and dynamic process of social
value creation (Golyagina, 2020; Cherrier et al., 2018).
The SEs complexity has imposed institutional pressures on the creation of a PMS in response to
multiple and competing field demands (Knardal, 2020; Dai et al., 2017). The main characteristics 
of the PMS should reflect the SEs’ strategic goals, be defined with qualitative and quantitative 
metrics, and be able to facilitate the provision of accurate performance evaluation information that 
should stimulate continuous improvement (Yee, 2020; Nielsen et al., 2019). However, SEs face
the challenge or pressure of clarifying or defining the societal outcomes of their core activities, 
and how these are to be measured and held accountable (Nicholls, 2009; Gendron, 2002). Although
it may be challenging, considering there are no clear performance measurement and accountability
systems identified for social value creation, the relationship between input factors and societal
outcomes could be defined (Nicholls, 2009) by determining customers’ perceived value of
receiving or using the social good (Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; Luke et al., 2013; Gendron, 
2002). Moreover, in the face of multiple and competing logics -such as within complex 
organisations- management accounting/PMS can be used to mediate and control institutional
conflicts through decoupling, compromising or combining mechanisms (Rozenfeld and Scapens, 
in press; Lepori and Montauti, 2020; Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019; Busco et al., 2017).
Chmelik et al. (2016) put forward three different categories of performance measurements that 
fulfill different purposes in SEs. First, performance measurements that are closely linked to
organisational decision-making and operations, and which aim to internal evaluation of the social
venture with a focus on the inputs and outputs of social value production. These serve as a means
to achieve organisational mediation and control (Luke et al., 2013; Gendron, 2002). Second, 
performance metrics that focus on measuring social value creation and societal outcomes. Third,
performance metrics developed for investors in social businesses who expect both financial return






      
  
       
   
 
      
      
       
      
       
   
  
     
  
       
     
  
    
    
      
  
    
  
  
   
     
      
    
   
      
    
 
       
    
    
      
      
     
  
     
  
      
Arena et al., 2015; Luke et al., 2013). Likewise, Kaufman and Covaleski (2019, p.42) contend that
“budgetary practices emerge as an observable, material expression of institutionalized beliefs 
within a particular setting at a particular time.” These practices represent an important performance
measurement tool amidst divergent institutional logics to ensure good organisation and governance
(see also Lepori and Montauti, 2020; Yee, 2020; Dai et al., 2017).
There is inherent difficulty in defining which performance dimensions are to be measured and 
monitored in the case of a SE (Arena et al., 2015). This is because construction of an accounting-
based PMS for these organisations should include a diversified set of metrics, such that their
multiple performance objectives (i.e., economic, environmental, and social) are covered. However,
because SEs are resource constrained (Nielsen et al., 2019), they may be unable to afford the high 
cost of data generation, staff time, and investments in information technology, in implementing
such comprehensive and reliable PMS. Furthermore, notwithstanding limited empirical evidence
that investing in performance measurement tools yields greater benefits, or of their impact on
business practices (Luke et al., 2013), the accounting measurement of social outcomes is neither 
seen by many SEs as an important management accounting tool nor as a source of competitive 
advantage (Lepori and Montauti, 2020; Luke et al., 2013). Additionally, the financial goals
(regarding wealth creation) of SEs can differ greatly, creating conceptual and/or practical 
difficulties in measuring and managing their performance (Nielsen et al., 2019; Chmelik et al., 
2016; Gendron, 2002). Thus, budgetary discretion provides a process through which a budgetary
system organised around a single dominant logic can incorporate activity justified through varying
peripheral logics (Lepori and Montauti, 2020; Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019). This paves the way
towards complexity and institutional logics within SEs’ internal PMS (Golyagina, 2020; Nielsen
et al., 2019; Dai et al., 2017).
2.2 The theoretical framework
The value of the Besharov and Smith (2014) framework appears in how it calls for an explanation 
of the diverse implications of logics multiplicity for internal conflict through three distinct but 
interrelated analytical levels (Knardal, 2020; Besharov and Smith, 2014). In the empirical sense,
Mauris is an important SE and one of the biggest in Egypt. With 13 branches in different rural
municipalities, its contribution to public health improvement by reaching out the poor rural 
communities is a key attraction. Mauris differs from many other SEs in that it was originally
funded by the Egyptian government and is restricted in the donations that it could solicit or receive.
Therefore, Mauris operates under significant socio-commercial logics in conflicts at the local and
national levels and provides appropriate institutional settings to analyse a complex PMS design
and implementation process. In large SEs (such as Mauris), the complex nature of the organisation 
could be sustained through government influence alongside the organisation’s accounting and
control practices (Busco et al., 2017; Dai et al., 2017). We argue that the identification and
implementation of performance measures -as mediated accounting tools within multiple logics and 
internal conflicts- are prerequisites for effective budgeting, reporting and control mechanisms 
within the organisation (Lepori and Montauti, 2020; Gendron, 2002).
Unlike other frameworks, the Besharov and Smith (2014) framework categorises organisations in 
terms of logics compatibility and logics centrality and explains how field, organisational, and
individual factors influence these two dimensions. Besharov and Smith (2014) explains that logics 






    
   
       
       
      
     
   
   
  
   
 
  
   
    
  
 
      
   
    
  
      
    
 
    
   
     
     
    
 
   
    
   
       
 
    
 
     
  
     
    
     
 
     
    
compatibility) or that logics provide contradictory prescriptions for action (instance of low 
compatibility). Logics centrality means that multiple logics are the essence of organisational 
performance (instance of high centrality) or that one logic is fundamental to organisational work 
while other logics are marginal (instance of low centrality). Therefore, in contrast to others
(Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; Skelcher and Smith, 2015; Pache and Santos, 2013), the logics
multiplicity framework within organisations (Besharov and Smith, 2014) is based on two
assumptions. First, multiple institutional logics belong to a cluster of logics compatibility or logics 
centrality. Second, the level of compatibility and centrality of multiple logics within an 
organisation depends not only on the organisational and individual levels but also extends to
include institutional field factors. Logics compatibility exists when multiple logics apply
coherently in an organisation, that is, when the relationship between organisational members with 
different duties is less conflictual. Logics centrality reflects the level of applicability of multiple 
logics in the organisation’s core activities (Knardal, 2020; Besharov and Smith, 2014).
Therefore, the logics multiplicity framework within organisations (Besharov and Smith, 2014)
distinguishes from other frameworks of multiple institutional logics. For example, Skelcher and
Smith’s (2015) framework connects multiple institutional logics to different organisational forms 
of hybridity. Using an institutional logics approach, they theorise “hybrids as entities” dealing with 
multiple normative frameworks. Their institutional framework establishes plural logics in five
forms of organisational hybridity – segmented, segregated, assimilated, blended, and blocked.
Each organisational form theoretically reflects different individual responses to institutional
pluralism. In parallel, Pache and Santos’ (2013) framework distinguishes different organisational
strategies for dealing with different individual responses to conflicting logics multiplicity. From
empirically observed differences, four main categories of individual responses within 
organisations were identified, including compliance, defiance, combination and 
compartmentalisation. Moreover, to expand the Pache and Santos’ (2013) model, Gebreiter and
Hidayah (2019) examine different individual responses to competing accountability pressures in a
hybridised public service organisation. Based on the seminal work of Pache and Santos (2013),
and notable empirical variations, eight additional sub-categories were considered for the Pache
and Santos’ (2013) basic framework, namely, enforced compliance, internalised compliance, 
compliance through exhaustion, instrumental compliance, categorical defiance, defiance with
justification, blending and translation. Although these attempts have provided meaningful
theoretical explanations on complexity and institutional logics, they do not benefit from the
Besharov and Smith’s (2014) field embeddedness in the richness of internal PMS analyses within 
politically sensitive SEs. The analyses of these attempts have included only both the organisational 
and individual logics levels, with little attention to the field or societal level institutional logics
and their subsequent pressures on PMS implementation within SEs (Knardal, 2020; Ferry and
Eckersley, 2020; Nielsen et al., 2019; McMullin and Skelcher, 2018).
In a SE context, to attend to a better understanding of internal PMS, we expand the Besharov and 
Smith’s (2014) multi-level logics analysis (field, organisational, and individual) to management 
accounting/PMS research insofar. Costa and Teixeira (2013), for example, urge institutional logics 
researchers to use multi-level analytical frameworks to achieve a better understanding of how 
organisations, especially complex organisations such as SEs, are affected by multiple logics, and 
how these competing logics influence their internal performance practices. Especially if there is a
controversial research topic that still needs more attention and consideration (Costa and Teixeira, 






     
     
  
   
      
       
     
       
    
    




    
      
     
   
  
  
   
  
     
   
      
    
    
       
    
 
  
    
        
       
   
   
   
    
   
     
   
   
     
           
       
SEs considering PMS for SEs as multi-dimensional systems (Arena et al., 2015). In parallel, Ferry
and Eckersley (2020) introduces and applies a three-stage institutional logics analysis to explore
the hybridisation (or complexity) process in English and Welsh local government budgetary
stewardship and performance improvement. This analysis, based on the interview data, has
included three successive stages: the recognition stage, the negotiation stage, and the
operationalisation stage of hybridisation. In a SE context, according to the overarching research
question and the institutional nature of our privatised case company, there is a need to use such 
multi-level analysis (Costa and Teixeira, 2013) and a three-stage process (Ferry and Eckersley,
2020) to explore the effect of field-level institutional logics (i.e., government pressures and
funding opportunities at the macro level) on micro-organisational PMS development. We do this
by employing the Besharov and Smith’s (2014) multi-level framework to add a new analytical
flavour to previous studies to understanding SEs’ institutional field pressures on applying the
process of complexity and institutional logics in developing their internal PMS.
Some previous studies employed Besharov and Smith (2014) framework. For instance, Dufays
and Huybrechts (2016) applied it to analyse how conflicting institutional logics at different 
organisational levels explain the success and failure of hybrid SEs. Voltan and De Fuentes (2016)
analyse success in scaling social innovations by applying the logic compatibility-centrality matrix
(Besharov and Smith, 2014) in partnerships. More recently, Knardal (2020) applied the Besharov 
and Smith (2014) framework to investigate if and how institutional complexity has played a vital 
role in shaping organisational performance management practices in arts organisations. However,
extant literature with accounting studies that employ the analytical framework is scanty (Knardal, 
2020). For instance, although Alawattage (2011) and Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe (2011) use
the term ‘logics’, they do not make use of Besharov and Smith’s (2014) approach and its logics 
multiplicity. Also, Ezzamel et al. (2012) address institutional change in the field of UK education
and the concomitant change in accounting practices, while Townley (1997) explains resistance to 
performance appraisals in the education service sector, or universities. However, these studies pay
scant attention to community institutions and their implications for performance measurement
logics. Importantly also, we were not able to identify previous research that employed both 
institutional logics and social cognition. Busco et al. (2017) argue that attempting to extend the 
contents of accounting and control practices to incorporate and accommodate multiple 
perspectives is less important than researching to understand how accounting practices succeed to
attract multiple concerns and numerous opinions surrounding accounting. Therefore, this study
makes a contribution by filling the gap in extant literature not only by its use of Besharov and
Smith’s (2014) framework, but also by bringing to light the social cognitive effect on its 
application (Ishaque, 2020; DeCaro et al., 2017; Bandura, 1989, 1986).
Combining different levels of logics compatibility and centrality at the organisational level leads 
to four ideal types of organisations, namely: contested, estranged, aligned and dominant (Besharov
and Smith, 2014). Contested organisations have low logics compatibility and high logics
centrality, with the likelihood of experiencing internal conflicts. Estranged organisations have low 
logics compatibility and low logics centrality, with the propensity of the superiority of one logic
over others, which start to shape organisational decisions and activities. Aligned organisations
have high logics compatibility and centrality, with the tendency of less internal conflicts among 
logics and organisational members, leading to a high level of organisational stability. Dominant
organisations have high logics compatibility and low logics centrality and are likely to have a






    
     
      
         
      
 
   
      
    
      
     
     
    
     
        
  
      
    
  
       
      
  
 
      
   
    
  
    
       
       
 
       
         
     
      
       
     
      
          
     
     
    
      
      
erroneous assumption that only one logic applies in that organisation (Besharov and Smith, 2014).
Simultaneous high degrees of centrality imply that the organisation can simultaneously
operationalise two competitive logics in a specific setting. The degree of logics compatibility, in 
this case, determines whether the organisation is likely to experience extensive or minimal 
conflicts among its key organisational members. In the former case, the organisation becomes
contested. In the latter, the organisation is aligned.
The thoughts, beliefs, and feelings of people affect their behaviour (Ishaque, 2020; Bandura,
1986), with their thought patterns and emotional reactions also partly determined by the natural
and external effects of their actions (Bandura, 1989). The design, function, and performance of
governance systems within organisations are not only influenced by multiple and competing 
institutional logics but also by social cognition and decision making, since they are socially
constructed (Ishaque, 2020) as is the case of Mauris. Social cognition (Bandura, 1986) is a model 
of reciprocal causation (of human behaviour) involving triadic reciprocal determinism, with
behaviour, cognition and other personal considerations, and environmental aspects operating as
interacting determinants, and having a bidirectional influence on each other (Cheng and Chu, 
2013). It is not implied by bidirectional causation that the influences occur simultaneously nor that 
the various sources of influence are of equal strength, since time is required for the influence of a
causal factor to be exerted, and for reciprocal influences to be triggered (Cheng and Chu, 2013).
Human decision-making within the Besharov and Smith’s (2014) logics multiplicity framework is 
afflicted by cognitive biases, engendered by the people, their incomplete knowledge, limitation to 
their cognitive capacity to effectively execute complex cognitive calculations, as well as by time 
(Besharov and Smith, 2014). All decisions involve predictions of future sentiments (Ishaque, 
2020), with the relationship between emotions and decision making bidirectional, considering 
emotions can influence decisions made, much as the outcome of decisions can influence the
emotions experienced by decision makers (Kahneman, 2003; Schwarz, 2000). The cognitive biases
in information processing by human decision makers are important, considering the social barriers
to adaptation that is created when people are rendered more susceptible to specific kinds of social
influence (DeCaro et al., 2017). In economic decision-making, intuitions and emotions should not
be ignored because although reason and emotion may often conflict, not all decisions resulting
from reason are appropriate, nor are all decisions resulting from emotion unsuitable (Frith and
Singer, 2008).
Because forces that shape logics compatibility and centrality are continuous, an organisation can
shift from one logic typology into another or combine different features of each logics typology
simultaneously (Besharov and Smith, 2014). Building on the concept of boundary objects to 
explore how accounting and control practices could contribute to the persistence of the multiple 
logics characterising complex organisations, Busco et al. (2017) argue that accounting and control
practices are mechanisms that result in mediation and openness, rather than consensus and 
compromise (see also Rozenfeld and Scapens, in press; Dai et al., 2017). Because accounting is
employed by users in a process of mediation, to attract and sustain distinct interests and concerns, 
with such distinctiveness not reduced in the search for harmony and sharedness (Busco et al.,
2017), numerous accounting practices could develop over time to incorporate distinct and
conflicting demands (Lepori and Montauti, 2020; Contrafatto and Burns, 2013). The shifting 
nature of logics typology provides an interesting field for this study to analyse the process of






       
   
 
     
 
  
       
   
    
     
   
           
   
  
  
   
   
      
    
     
 
    
      
 
   
     
       
  
     
  
       
   
   
        
       
  
      
  
   
   
     
     
further conceptual and empirical studies on how SEs manage their performance to meet
government-level institutional pressures (Ferry and Eckersley, 2020; Manville and Greatbanks,
2020; Golyagina, 2020; Yee, 2020; Knardal, 2020; Nielsen et al., 2019; Dufays and Huybrechts, 
2016). Also, the use of social cognition to shed light on the decision making of the firm, adds an
important twist to this research.
3. Data and methodology
We adopted a field research methodology in conducting an interpretive case study (Yin, 2013). 
We employed this approach to conduct semi-structured interviews, observations and document
analysis during the main data collection. The complementarity of multiple data sources was 
valuable to improve the value of archival data from document analysis (Yin, 2013), and facilitate 
an adequate investigation of the relationship between designing and implementing a socio-
economic PMS in a SE. Our research approach provided an opportunity to analyse a new PMS
design and implementation process based on KPIs, including financial performance and societal
health improvement assessment metrics in Mauris. In addition, continuous contacts with 
interviewees and the organisation helped us clarify ambiguities and contradictions arising from 
documents analysis, interviews and participation in meetings. This enhanced the validity and
reliability of our research data and findings (Vaivio, 2008). Furthermore, field study research
method facilitates the analysis of managerial ambiguities, tensions and contradictions, since it
permits analysis and interpretation of themes. It also enhances understanding of the complexity of
accounting and performance measurement operations in organisations (Ahrens and Dent, 1998).
Additionally, it provided the appropriate context for exploring the effect of social cognition on 
managerial decisions (DeCaro et al., 2017; Schwarz, 2000).
The Egyptian context of SEs has distinct institutional logics which oriented the case company
towards PMS implementation. To good governance and social legitimacy in the new public
management mechanisms, the Egyptian government, through financial incentives calculated by
KPIs, put SEs (e.g., Mauris) under certain resource dependency pressures that influenced the 
internal interplay of commercial and social logics and then the choice of certain KPIs. Compared
to previous literature, PMS implementation is a political tool that the case company used to meet
the institutional demands of the government funding scheme. Non-political (accounting-based)
KPIs have turned into political tools to gain societal acceptance and legitimacy. This field-research
is truly unique and distinct from others in previous literature. As stated above, the government’s 
influence within the case company has been institutionalised through financial incentives
calculated by KPIs. This political involvement (which appears as no involvement) has, and still
has, affected the organisational-level interplay of commercial and social logics as well as the 
individual-level choice of KPIs for SEs’ internal PMS. This specific case adds a new fact to
previous literature that institutional logics and their interplay are ‘in a state of flux’ within SEs’
internal PMS. It can also indicate that institutional pressure emphasises the financial side, but when 
selecting KPIs, a social logic emerges, which is a rather counter-intuitive and interesting finding
to answer our research question.
Two datasets were collected in this study. The first was data obtained from document analysis, 
participation, and observations. During our field visits, access was granted to data such as internal
reports, minutes of board meetings and other internal documents. Relevant data was also obtained






     
      
      
        
      
   
 
      
      
     
      
      
   
   
        
    
     
 
   
     
 
      
       
       
 
   
    
      
       
     
     
     
      
    
     
    
    
   
       
         
 
   
      
       
enterprise. The second dataset consists of 35 interviews conducted in two stages: the pilot study
and the main study. Seven (7) interviews were conducted in the pilot phase, in the autumn of 2017, 
and twenty-eight (28) interviews were conducted in the main study, between December 2017,
March 2018, and June-July 2019. The pilot study interviews were unstructured, and were of a more
generic nature, seeking to establish an understanding of the operating logics of the social business,
the relevance of the social mission in organisational decision making and actions, and the views
of various participants in the process. 
The second set of interviews (main data) were semi-structured and reflected the experience from
action research, knowledge from the pilot interviews. The use of semi-structured interviews (as
opposed to open and exploratory interviews) was because the participants were generally reluctant 
to say anything controversial, especially since they were the firm’s current management. 
Therefore, their claims were taken at face value, differentiating our academic research from
investigative journalism (Yin, 2013; Bryman, 2012; O’Dwyer, 2004). It is worth noting that a
semi-structured interview guide was adapted for each interview. Having a single guide for all
interviewees would not have served the purposes of this study, given the very diverse roles and
responsibilities of participants (Yin, 2013). Twenty-eight (28) interviews were conducted, and 
interviewees included accountants, finance manager, operations managers, project managers,
managing directors, auxiliaries, international volunteers and board members, with practical 
experiences in the management and accounting fields ranging from 5 to 15 years. The interviews 
were conducted in Arabic or English, based on interviewee’s choice of language. They were
recorded and subsequently transcribed. Interviews conducted in Arabic were translated to English 
and back to Arabic, to ensure the accuracy of translation. The average duration of each interview
was approximately fifty-five minutes. Interviewees were contacted, when necessary, to facilitate
understanding of anything that remained vague and to enable a follow-up on anything new that
might have occurred in the company’s operational PMS.
During the main study, two joint meetings were held, one with the Plant Manager and the Project 
Manager, and the other with the Head of Innovation and the Chairman of the Board. These
meetings, lasting about an hour each, were geared at discussing the social value of the drinking
water refining project and the role that the ‘complexity’ plays in its PMS. Our request to observe
various meetings was initially declined due to the confidentiality of the issues often discussed,
especially if these were considered strategic. Nevertheless, the evolving relationship and 
increasing levels of trust with the ‘gatekeepers’ resulted in limited access to meetings eventually
granted. Thus, we participated in eight meetings as observers. These included performance
management meetings and management accounting meetings at corporate level which we were
recorded in field notes. These meeting observations enhanced our understanding of performance
measurement logics, management accounting interactions and decision-making within the firm.
Observing meeting deliberations also facilitated our understanding of how the social cognition of
participants impacted the tension between the institutional logics of the SE. In addition, secondary
data were collected from considerable documentary materials relating to Mauris. These included
internal documents, publicly distributed printed documents, and material made available on the
websites of organisations involved. This provided a rich source of information on the company in 
general, and for understanding its numerous operational processes relating to accounting. 
Data analysis was manually performed, to maintain interviewees’ words and phrases close to their






     
     
    
            
      
   
    
    
      
       
    
  
 
     
     
   
   
    
      
       
 
 
       
         
    
   
       
    
 
 
    
       
   
    
      
    
     
 
       
      
         
(Bryman, 2012). The overall analysis of the data was based on careful reading and re-reading of
the interview transcripts and field diary notes. Firstly, we read the interview transcripts
simultaneously with listening to the audio recordings. This helped to get an overview and ‘feel’
for the data. Secondly, we read the transcripts and looked for issues of relevance to our study. We
used open codes to classify those issues. Our use of the coding/recording method commenced with
the pilot study. Every new issue that emerged from the interview material was assigned a code. In 
the third and final stage, we re-read parts of the transcripts related to each code. In doing so, we
looked for themes that shared several open codes (i.e., the first coding, or/and the second order
coding). This process enabled us to go back to Mauris to collect more data until we reached the
point of saturation (Yin, 2013). During this iterative process in which the interview transcripts and
notes were summarised and analysed thematically (Miles et al., 2013; O’Dwyer, 2004), patterns
in spoken words and underlying messages and motives, as well as confirmation of the emerging 
significant issues, emerged.
Throughout the stages of data analysis, the institutional logics in the investigated field were being
shaped in our view, as researchers. This was mainly data driven, but also depended on the literature
to an extent. Two main sets of logics were discerned and investigated: commercial and social 
logics. Commercial logics are about market conditions and the industry, that is, they concern the
competitive structure of the case organisation. In contrast, social logics involve the case
organisation’s non-profit practices such as providing safe water in the remote poor areas at a low 
cost. Data collected through different methods in this study confirmed each other to be trustworthy
(Yin, 2013; Bryman, 2012).
4. Empirical findings
Consistent with the theoretical framework by Besharov and Smith (2014), we set out the findings 
of this study in three interrelated levels: institutional field, organisation, and individual. While the
institutional field sets up the context in which Mauris operates, the organisation level focuses on
Mauris. The individual level explains the relationships between the organisation’s members and
competing institutional logics in designing and implementing a PMS at a micro level, that is, levels 
of compatibility. We use a critical approach to reflect on Mauris’ social mission and its practical 
impact, that is, levels of centrality.
4.1 The institutional field of Mauris: the influence of government
Government influence played an important role in reconstructing Mauris’ institutional field. The
new performance system introduced by the Social Enterprise Act (2011) changed the operational 
characteristics of Egyptian SEs as it aimed to increase productivity, promote cost-efficiency, and 
establish transparency and accountability. SEs became independent legal entities with financial 
autonomy, and separate from the state. Even the board structure of the SEs changed to include
external members. A senior executive manager confirms this fact by saying that the new Social 
Enterprise Act (2011) requires around 30-35% of board members to be external. They include
academics, practitioners, and military officers.
Despite this legitimated autonomy, SEs are still partially funded by the government. The funding 
model is based on producing a ‘financial incentive’ for achieving targets set by the government. 






        
    
       
    
      
        
 
    
       
     
 
       
          
      
 
     
 
   





   
     
  
     




   
  
      
  
    
 
    
   
  
example, in Mauris, these targets are divided into the following three themes: house connections
(39%), tap points (33%) and jar sales policy (28%). Mauris receives funding for each societal 
target achieved. The uptake and consumption of potable water was considered a proxy for societal
health improvement. The formula was amended in 2012, 2014 and 2015, with the recent
amendments consistent with the new public management policy of emphasising the new
performance system, with a stronger efficiency incentive on the public value. The senior
accountant explains:
This new model gave SEs an opportunity to compete with each other, especially in 
the areas under the government funding … If the target set by the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity (MOSS) is not achieved, a SE would not receive the full amount of 
funding. 
From 2010 to 2012, the financial incentive for meeting the target increased annually at a rate of
2%–4% of the funding. However, in 2013, there was a noticeable reduction (for the first time) in
total government funding, from 14% to 9%. The funding remained at the same level until 2016 
when it was again slashed by 3%. As per Mauris’ finance manager:
In Mauris, yearly revenues from funding began decreasing after it peaked in 2012.
The reason for this reduction was the political revolution in Egypt at that time and 
subsequent negative effects on the state’s public budget and government funding
sources … The use of fewer resources led to deteriorating outputs, particularly in 
societal activities. Financial aspects now dominate the SEs field.
The managing director reinforced this view by saying:
The current military leadership in Egypt emphasises the financial aspect of re-
building (modern) Egypt after the political revolutions (2011 and 2013) that swept
the Egyptian economy. Many field and organisational issues were born behind it. 
Since the state leadership moved from the Muslim Brotherhood to the military in
2013, the focus of the SEs field has become the financial aspect first. The political 
logic here has stemmed from the financial crisis and the economic collapse that
occurred in Egypt after two revolutions and the inability to provide full financial
support to SEs. 
A senior accountant confirmed this financial focus:
Although some countries (such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and
international bodies (such as the World Bank and the European Union) provided 
Egypt with some financial support and long-term loans, the Egyptian government
was unable at that time to cover its social and economic obligations simultaneously, 
whether at the national or even the local level. This was the first stepping stone 
towards SEs’ financial autonomous that created social and commercial tensions in
their internal performance measures.
Mauris responded to these changes by implementing operational and structural reforms which
involved shifting from operating branches and departments, to service centres and, later, into 






      
     
        
       
    
 
      
  





    
       
 
    
    
      
      
     
      
 
      
     
        
 
    
          
  
     
     
   
        
   
   
         
    
   
 
operations manager commented that two [specific-purpose] units were also removed due to 
unprofitability of operations. To be autonomous, Mauris had to fulfill two pre-requisites imposed
by the government. First, its real estate had to be restructured into a separate firm owned by several
entities. Second, it had to establish ‘shared service centres’ responsible for bookkeeping, payroll
and other accounting functions. A senior accountant adds to these organisational field pre-
requisites that:
The use of SAP-ERP technology to implement accounting processes generated
[more] flexibility. It facilitated the implementation of the KPIs measurement
system, the development of management accounting tools and the preparation of
performance control reports.
4.2 The organisational level: the interplay of commercial and social logics
Government involvement through the funding scheme influenced the organisational-level 
interplay of commercial and social logics within Mauris. In conformity with the Social Enterprise
Act (2011), Mauris is an independent legal entity with an obligation of financial autonomy. Its
goal is to provide affordable potable water to the rural population in Egypt. The Chairman of the
Board of Mauris explained:
The cornerstone of our business is to save communities from problems [or diseases]
destroying their social welfare… The problem that Egyptian [urban and rural]
communities suffer from is the water… The water stations, especially in remote
villages, began supplying unhealthy [unclean] water to those villages and, hence,
the health of the dwellers was clearly deteriorating… Therefore, Mauris focused on
supplying healthy [clean] water at affordable cost by installing filtered water
stations in these villages.
As in any other social business, the status of Mauris differs from the status of non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and not-for-profit organisations. For example, while NGOs and not-for-
profit organisations can use donations to finance the delivery of social goods and services, Mauris
has no such possibility. Mauris’ social status reflects two different institutional logics (commercial 
and social) that seem to compete depending on the power and status of each organisational member
in a specific decision-making context. According to Kiesler and Sproull (1982), considering that 
firms, subunits within firms, and individual members of subunits are self-centred, the logic of
motivationally driven social cognition remains valid irrespective of whether motives are held only
by individuals or are shared in groups (Ishaque, 2020; Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; Dai et al., 
2017). A member of the executive board explained:
Mauris does not aim to generate or maximise profits. We are like any NGO and
not-for-profit organisation, although our financial status differs from them. These
organisations depend on donations to raise funds. Our problem here is the ‘fund’…
I mean … the way we can finance our social activities in remote rural areas. We
had to adopt the commercial ideologies [of a private sector] alongside our
fundamental social mission. Our [work] slogan now became social logic first, but







   
      
      
      
    
   
   
     
         
    
    
 
  
      
    
      
     
     
    
 
  
     
       
         
       
  
    
    
      
     
 
    
 
 
The managing director confirmed:
Yes, the central government funds us through financial incentive calculated by
KPIs... But not enough... The government incentive covers only fixed costs [water
infrastructure maintenance costs] but not salaries, rental costs ... Thus, Mauris has 
to sell water to urban homes at an affordable cost to secure money to cover other
operating costs and to subsidise rural water supply... However, this subsidisation 
should not be achieved at the expense of developing social values, such as reducing 
arsenic water consumption to improve the health safety of the rural population.
The head of innovation (HoI) had a more practical approach:
We cannot put all operating costs to the rural people. To make potable water 
affordable for them, we need subsidise by going to the urban market. It is still
reasonable to achieve financial sustainability by cross subsidising… So finance is 
important, then social…
The finance manager confirmed:
Our financial analysis shows that growth of revenues to achieve breakeven has
become more important in the short term than growth of social value. This is
understandable because the financial viability of Mauris is a pre-requisite for
delivering social value. Yet, there is a risk that maintaining breakeven becomes a
social business mission more than increasing the social value of its goods and
services. The KPIs measurement system was not able to produce metrics that
prevent potential mission drift.
The head of sustainability added:
At any rate, the questions are…: Is there room for something else than philanthropy
and business as usual? Does this third way have a vocation to continue? […] Would
it make sense over time? Does it make sense only in relation to Egypt or the sanitary
context…? Does it complete the range of existing models, or does it compete with 
them?
The head of sustainability was particularly concerned about the extent to which Mauris can go in 
combining commercial and social goals without risking its social status. These seemingly
contradictory objectives make social business a true complex organisation, embedded in two 
institutional logics, in pursuit of different goals and with different means of achieving them (Yee,
2020; Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; Pache and Santos, 2010). 
Based on the above, we present a (funding) model of the Egyptian SE (Mauris) in Figure 1:
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]






    
      
   
       
      
   
     
      
  
         
   
     
      
    
   
 
       
    
     
    
 
    
    
    
      
    
     
   
    
   
    
      
    
 
   
        
     
                                                          
        
 
From document analysis, we noticed that the number of consumers of safe water at the start of the 
project in 2010 was about 70% below expectations in its business plan. Not consuming safe water
meant that Mauris had an urgent task to improve its financial performance so that it could be able
to provide potable water to the needy rural communities. A research initiative set up in 2010 by
the firm had a mission of designing a new measurement system to measure social values and their
improvement. A pre-requirement for the maximisation of social value is to assess how to set
performance metrics and goals, and how to measure their outputs and societal outcomes. The
leadership of Mauris called the new measurement system KPIs. KPIs were supposed to monitor
the evolution of both financial and social outcomes.
Many stakeholders2 of Mauris had different views, however, of what each KPI meant, and on
which of them their daily activities should focus. Mauris’ project manager commented:
… In our company, we have people coming from other companies, NGOs, and 
development agencies. This mix of people may work together, but do not have the
same understanding of what this kind of company does…
Another challenge was to combine the social needs of the rural population with the commercial
performance targets of the project. The project manager explained:
It is the responsibility of our company to do something for the humanity for our
people. (…) That achievement should not be measured in monetary terms, but with
other human factors. I think the value of this is more than financial… This is my
feeling... However, it should be decided by those financing this project. 
In this setting, Mauris managers had to deal with trade-offs between financial performance and 
social value improvement. For instance, considering the installation of a new water connection at 
any location is an investment decision, the monetary aspects (e.g., costs, contributions) influence
the choice of location. This is contrary to the Project Manager’s view that contribution to 
“humanity” should not be attributed monetary values. However, the financial aspects (e.g., costs) 
are important considering they enable the comparability of operational options the firm is 
presented with. This chimes with the argument that human decision-making is plagued by
cognitive biases (DeCaro et al., 2017; Kahneman, 2003) in information processing (DeCaro et al., 
2017), caused by incomplete knowledge and inadequate cognitive mental resources of people
(Kahneman, 2003). Mauris’ HoI commented:
It is about trade-offs. I have the impression that senior management is drawn to: “a
connection cannot be made there because it’s too costly,” etc. Thus, a social 
indicator, consistent with the overall goals of the project, is required alongside the
economic indicator.  
The finance manager confirmed this. The HoI gave further practical clarification:
When we want to create tap points for water access, we ask the population to
express their demand for it. Sometimes we have three, or four-five-six, some 







      
          
           
      
    
 
 
   
   
     
   
       
       
   
       
    
      
         
 
  
    
     
       
     
 
   
         
    
        
      
    
  
    
    
       
      
         
    
     
        
clusters or villages asking for water. While some of them are big villages, big
clusters, others are quite a distance away. Yet some do have many children, and
others many people who are ill... We have to make a choice. How do we choose
with all these demands? Therefore, we employed these KPIs to bring in some sort 
of management [accounting] techniques - to facilitate the resolution of setting up
tap points. 
4.3 The inter-individual level: the choice of KPIs for internal PMS
The interplay of commercial and social logics at the organisational level, generated from 
government involvement at the field level and then put Mauris under certain resource dependency
pressures, influenced the choice of KPIs for Mauris’ internal PMS. The Mauris management
wanted a short list of indicators that could be monitored regularly and used in an operational 
manner. The indicators were to be scientifically designed to provide relevant and reliable 
performance information for use in managerial decision-making and external disclosure to
stakeholders. The HoI explained:
At some point, we will go and talk about the performance of [Mauris] … by
providing some indicators that are understandable by third parties and are
academically supported. I will also need to be able to say that this indicator and this 
way of seeing things […] are considered to be the most adequate to evaluate the
project... 
The chief accountant had a similar view:
Mauris has to implement the KPIs model to monitor the performance targets set by
the government. Thus, we seek to define indicators through which we can measure
our performance efficiency in delivering both social and commercial public
services. It is important that the indicators are considered meaningful, achievable,
reliable… and on a scientific basis.
The operations manager confirmed this and further commented:
Mauris measures the social value through certain KPIs … or, as we say in practice,
performance efficiency indicators …, and considers this information in 
organisational decision-making. With these [KPIs], we can measure the social
value of a rural water supply project. Through the annual measurement of these
indicators, management can assess the actual improvement of public health in the
rural area compared to performance targets set by the government.
The project team agreed from the beginning on two main dimensions upon which to define and
design KPIs, that is, the social and the commercial. Regarding the social dimension, three main 
aspects were agreed on. First, the size (scale) of the project, and specifically the number of
inhabitants who have unrestricted access to the water points. The scale of the project translates 
into the project’s ability to involve the largest possible number of people in the new safe water
network. Second, the penetration (diffusion) level of the new network; the capability of a safe
water project to permeate the covered areas and change the behaviour and habits of their local






       
 
        
    
       
      
     
         
 
       
       
      
    
       
          
    
  
   
      
      
       
     
      
  
      
       
     
     
     
     
  
       
    
   
          
    
   
   
                                                          
              
  
Third, to ensure the regular consumption of safe drinking water by customers, and for these
customers to stop using arsenic-contaminated water from elsewhere.
Regarding the commercial dimension, two key aspects were selected. First, the self-financing rate,
a relevant and important variable because Mauris had chosen to rely solely on its selling turnover, 
excluding any external subsidies3. Second, the efficiency. Because it is not enough for Mauris to 
breakeven, it needed (and still needs) a metric allowing it to measure the contribution margin of 
each cluster of customers, such as the contribution margin of each safe water checkpoint. Hence,
the project team chose to monitor the water cost to ensure that customers pay for a service that
ensures expenditure control.
The choice of key financial performance indicators followed a debate between operational and
accounting team members. While the operational team raised the issue of water wastage during 
the process of water delivery, the accounting team focused on key financial issues, that is, sales
revenue and financial profitability metrics. The finance manager explained:
Our rural water services do not give us enough sales revenue because the sale of
water there is at the lowest possible price. The result is increased operational costs
in the rural areas. Thus, Mauris had to sell water in the urban areas at a higher price,
in order to subsidise the rural water services and to secure its financial stability. 
The operations manager agreed, but also commented:
Yes, I agree… But how dependent should we be on the urban market? Fifty
percent? Seventy percent? Even if ninety percent dependence, it is not good because
we are actually running a social company… As we consider financial figures as
most important performance indicators, we should also consider operational risks
that might increase operating costs and reduce revenue. For example, the issue of
water wastage during water delivery.
Thus, while financial figures were considered the most essential indicators, it was necessary that
cognisance be taken of the probability of revenue reduction resulting from increased operational
risks. Although both managers finally agreed to include the efficiency indicator as a KPI, it was 
eliminated during implementation in order to reduce the number of key indicators. This is 
consistent with Bandura and Jourden (1991) who contend that in real-life environments, decisions 
are made from a broad range of information within continuous and time-constrained organisational
activity, and with social and self-evaluative consequences (Ishaque, 2020; Cheng and Chu, 2013).
After defining the key indicators, the process of collecting key performance data was technically
academic, rigorous and practical. It was important to organise a reliable process of collecting
relevant operational data. The operational team, composed of employees who visit inhabitants to
assess water health safety awareness, collected the data. Because it was noted during this process
that the calculation of some indicators was not at a satisfactory level, it was considered necessary
for the operational teams to change their measurement practices. For example, with respect to the 
penetration rate, a change in measurement has been established in practice. The water dealers 







    
      
    
     
          
     
        
     
 
     
      
          
        
    
     
      
     
          
     
 
    
       




   
      
  
  
     
     
    
   
   
    
 
   
        
      
  
   
(locals sell water to others, either in the same area or in different areas) must document their daily
deals with customers in particular (accounting) records, rather than just using a measurement that
relies only on traditional water meter readings. The former method muddled two different kinds
of measurements, that is, local residents and average local consumption. This was a big problem
because the project must necessarily set a target for a large average water consumption per
household. To reach Mauris’ social goal, it is better if the safe water project contains fewer 
households that consume a large amount of water, rather than containing many families that
consume less water. The desired outcome of improved health will only be achieved if people stop
consuming water from alternatives contaminated with arsenic.
While collecting performance data, the operational team collected data on local households and 
the number of their members, without making an assessment of whether or not people are
consuming safe water. The team based this statistic on the claim that possible consumers would
usually reside less than 65-66 metres from the tap water point. Moreover, a new data collection 
process was introduced so that water dealers began to keep a daily record of purchases for each
customer. The team combined customer data with potential households to achieve a new method 
for calculating penetration. The new method helped the team to calculate the percentage of the
local population included, day-to-day consumption, and regular customers (homes with water
consumption contains a minimum of 75% filtered water are considered as no longer drinking water
polluted with arsenic or other toxic substances). As for the financial data, the project team relied
on the accounting data that the local team issues monthly.
Following the identification of KPIs and their measurement, and consistent with the Social
Enterprises Act’s (2011) requirements, the finance manager produces quarterly performance
efficiency reports, which are sent to senior management and then to the government/MOSS. The
finance manager explained:
Based on the monthly data collected by the operational teams, the accountants 
calculate the KPIs and present them to senior management in the form of a quarterly
performance efficiency report. ... This report, practically called the KPIs report, 
plays a vital role in organisational decision-making processes … The KPIs report
reflects the overall operating (cost) movement of the different urban and rural areas 
in which Mauris serves commercially and/or socially.
The KPIs report is an influential accounting report in organisational decision-making. A senior
accountant indicated that senior management depends on the overall performance report in 
assessing the financial stability, urban and rural water tariffs, and employees’ promotions. They
are also used to assess the operational costs movement in the last quarter compared to previous 
quarters, and to take any necessary actions. A senior operations manager expressed dissatisfaction 
over the frequency with which management receives the KPIs report (see excerpt below). 
However, although the speed with which information reaches the manager is increased, Kiesler
and Sproull (1982) argue that primacy effects, information overload and errors of attribution will
still occur, albeit sooner. Further, there could be good non-cognition reasons for calling for more
timely information, however, certain cognitive processes are not altered by an increased rate of
information acquisition (Ishaque, 2020; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). A senior executive manager 






    
   
    
     
      
 
  
       
    
    
     
      
    
        
  
         
     
   
       
     
       
 
   
  
    
       
          
 
     
   
     
     
 
    
   
 
         
  
      
 
The KPIs-based quarterly performance efficiency report is an important 
management accounting tool in making the right decisions. For example, in 2014, 
this report revealed some rural areas suffering from massive water wastages and
increased operational costs. To resolve this issue, senior management had to install
some advanced water supply equipment with which the company could manage the
operating (cost) movement remotely in these areas.
Also, a senior operations manager agreed and disagreed with this:
Yes, I agree and disagree… I agree that this report is a useful accounting tool in 
making our managerial decisions … I remember, in 2015, the KPIs report indicated 
a significant decrease in societal health improvements in rural areas and a
significant increase in mortality rate there. Our investigation team concluded that
this was caused by their use of unclean water over the past years. In response, senior
management had to send social experts to educate people about the importance of
using (clean) filtered water sources to improve their health, reduce mortality and
build a healthy and safe society…
… But I disagree that we have to wait for the KPIs [quarter to quarter] report before
making our decisions when there are important matters that require our urgent 
attention. For example, we suffer from the issue of illiteracy and lack of education 
in these rural areas. Despite the intervention of experienced teams sent by … to
raise awareness, people have maintained their culture and behaviour in using
unhealthy water supply sources. At this point, we still have side effects that could
be harmful to the entire project.
Thus, producing the KPIs report enabled Mauris to move from metrics that rely solely on water 
sales to performance indicators that show the individual behaviour of the population and facilitate
the observation of such consumption behaviour. Data collected on the local population identify the
residents who consume safe drinking water and those who do not. Since sales growth does not
equal an increase in the social value of the safe water project, collecting this data is critical. There
are at least two reasons explaining the gap between sales and social value improvements.
First, locals can use more water for goals instead of drinking. A senior executive manager argued 
that the assessment of health improvement indicators shows that arsenic contamination comes
from drinking water from unclean sources. It is an ‘incorrect’ claim that improved community
health results from increased water consumption. Because regularity of consumption is more
fundamental; emphasising the growth of regular consumers rather than the growth in sales acts as 
a change from the measurement of outputs to outcomes. Distinguishing between outputs and
outcomes is fundamental to evaluating community health improvement. Outputs metrics measure
Mauris’ activities while the outcomes revolve around what has changed for the people who benefit 
from these activities. Measuring regularity in consumption is a proxy for finding out if people have
changed their behaviours and habits for better health.
Second, the water that Mauris provides is not the only source of uncontaminated water.






     
        
    
        
    
       
 
   
     
    
  
          
     
    
      
  
     
  
      
   
 
         
      
       
     
 
  
      
     
       
   
         
      
  
   
   
     
                                                          
          
Actually, we cannot ask residents in rural areas to stop using water from other
supply sources such as deep tube wells, because these sources are not necessarily
contaminated … Instead, operations teams always advise local residents to use
Mauris’ supply sources. The motivation is that we supply absolutely safe and clean
water, and our quality assurance teams regularly test our sources. Mauris does not 
aim to sell water but just to assist residents drink safe and healthy water. Therefore, 
we are always looking for locals who still suffer from water contamination.
The finance manager agreed, but also commented:
When assessing societal health improvement as an outcome of selling safe water,
one needs to strike a balance between what actually occurred and what would have
occurred if the safe water project had not been implemented. If local residents 
change their habits from using a safe water source to a regular consumption of
Mauris’ water, there is no potential outcome for improving community health, 
because there is no reduction in arsenic contamination or other toxic substances. 
This was noted through the national health impact study that Mauris conducted in
collaboration with the Egyptian Ministry of Public Health in November 2018.
Hence, societal health improvement is not just about positive outcomes. It is also about preventing
negative outcomes such as public health deterioration. However, the KPIs in standard contract 
forms for water services are based on outputs such as drinking water quality or customer service, 
but not on outcomes and change in consumer habits. In this regard, the senior executive manager
explained:
You will have a KPI that focuses heavily on construction business— mileage of
installed water pipelines for a period of one month, six months, nine months or even
one year; the number of connections repaired … You will have certain KPIs on
water quality parameters … Customer KPIs could be, for example, the response 
time between the phone call and the response on the ground.
The project manager gave further explanation:
Well, I think [Mauris] projects4 have the most impact on health and how to
positively develop it. … Once the network is established and the population
consumes the normal rate of drinking water, you just have to manage it the right
way. It is a kind of maintenance job. This means that the municipality and the 
Ministry of Social Solidarity will require you to submit a performance report in 
terms of technical management, to reduce costs, to be more efficient. But not to
improve your health impact... because all the work has already been completed. 
However, societal health improvement assessment requires measuring outcomes instead of just
outputs. Therefore, our investigation to see whether societal outcomes can be used to measure
operating performance was met with a reaction that the achievement of societal outcomes could 






      
 
     
      
      
 
   
      
    
     
     
   
  
 
    
    
    
      
   
 
     
   
  
       
    
    
    
    
         
     
     
    
    
  
      
   
 
      
     
not be considered to be dependent exclusively on the performance of Mauris’ employees. The
managing director explained:
I concur that those who analyse the overall level of the project should actively
develop the indicators that are being evaluated … However, with so many
anonyms, I am not sure how to use these KPIs to evaluate the operating
performance of our employees in practice.
In addition, the managing director commented clarifying his position:
There are two points of view. Sustainability Performance Manager is sure of the
point of view … that contributes to materialise, measure and record project 
performance. So, you can have relatively advanced KPIs, etc. Then, there will be
KPIs for internal use in evaluating the operating performance of our employees. 
Because it is impossible for employees to know that fumigated measurements will
be used in their true evaluation.
5. Discussion
In this section, we start by analysing and discussing the position of Mauris in the Besharov and
Smith (2014) framework of logics multiplicity in organisations and the organisational-level
interplay of commercial and social logics resulting from the field-level government funding and
accountability pressures. Then, we situate the choice of KPIs for Mauris’ internal PMS with
respect to previous PMS literature on SEs complexity and institutional logics.
5.1 The position of Mauris in the logics multiplicity framework
The case findings reveal that the field-level institutional logics have been internalised into the
conflicting belief systems of social welfare and commercial logics within Mauris. Each logical
system has unique and different institutional characteristics in terms of its organisational mission, 
ownership structure, control techniques, and political legitimacy (Rozenfeld and Scapens, in press;
Knardal, 2020; Besharov and Smith, 2014; Pache and Santos, 2013; Gendron, 2002). In line with
Besharov and Smith (2014), the field-level mission of Mauris’ social logic is to provide affordable
products and/or services (represented by safe drinking water) to meet local social demands. This
has led to the institutionalisation of the non-profit organisational form (Dai et al., 2017), which
gained legitimacy from Mauris’ non-redistribution pressure and ownership structure that delegates 
power to a population committed to a social mission (Arena et al., 2015). Democratic oversight,
under the Social Enterprise Act (2011) and the government model of funding and accountability,
constitutive of the SEs status, is a suitable means of controlling strategy and operations, enabling 
Mauris to fulfill local social demands. Hence, the motive for social acceptance and political 
legitimacy of this welfare logic is to contribute to Mauris’ social mission (Mättö et al., 2020;
Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; Pache and Santos, 2013).
In contrast, regarding Mauris’ commercial logics, the field-level mission is to trade goods and/or
services in the market for an economic surplus that Mauris can legitimately re-allocate to 
implement social (drinking water) projects that meet rural population needs. This, in turn, created
the need for a profit-making organisational form whose legitimacy stems from Mauris’ property






   
     
   
      
 
  
       
      
        
    
    
   
    
   
     
    
   
       
    
    
 
     
    
      
  
      
      
    
    
   
    
   
  
   
  
  
   
     
 
       
   
     
     
   
return (Lepori and Montauti, 2020). Hierarchical control is a suitable mechanism through which 
Mauris can govern strategy and operations in order to ensure the consistency of the social services 
provided and the efficient allocation of economic resources (Golyagina, 2020). Therefore, social
legitimacy and political acceptance of this economic logic are inspired by Mauris’ technical and 
managerial expertise (Knardal, 2020; Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; Besharov and Smith, 2014;
Pache and Santos, 2013).
Hence, the case findings show that Mauris belongs to the category of estranged organisations
(Besharov and Smith, 2014) because of two key aspects: First, in practice, the commercial logic
prevail over the social logic. This means that the level of centrality between commercial and social
logics is low (Besharov and Smith, 2014). Second, the compatibility of commercial and social
logics in the daily operations of Mauris is low (Besharov and Smith, 2014). In fact, during data
collection process, we observed that Mauris’ commercial viability was a priority. Management 
team members confirmed that managing operational costs and improving sales turnover was
crucial to Mauris’ survival as a social organisation. Many factors explain how and why Mauris 
became estranged. For instance, at the organisational field level, Mauris is expected to be a SE. 
This means that contrary to not-for-profit organisations (Yee, 2020; Dai et al., 2017), Mauris is
not able to raise funds through donations or subsidies from international funding organisations. 
The SE status of Mauris inhibits funding opportunities that would help Mauris to set a higher
priority on improving the societal health of the rural population that consumes its safe water. 
Another organisational field factor is that it was not possible for Mauris to self-finance its rural 
drinking water operations without using the transfer pricing method.
Mauris’ transfer pricing was based on selling the urban water jar at an affordable price and using
the sales revenue to finance rural water activities. Although this transfer pricing method helped 
Mauris operate at the rural and urban levels, it also provided a very strong basis for commercial 
logics to prevail over social logics at the organisational level, considering the lack of financing 
alternatives available. Therefore, we argue that the prevalence of one institutional logic over
another may take place at the organisational and individual levels because of organisational field 
pressures and government funding opportunities, not because of other conflicts within the
organisation. This finding contributes to previous PMS literature on institutional logics and SEs 
complexity (Ferry and Eckersley, 2020; Mättö et al., 2020; Knardal, 2020; Nielsen et al., 2019;
Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019; McMullin and Skelcher, 2018; Busco et al., 2017; Carlsson-Wall
et al., 2016). For example, although Mauris’ board chairman suggested fifty percent criteria for
urban and rural revenue, the need for financial survival was so acute at the start of the safe water
project that the firm’s leadership could not have halted the urban water business even if it exceeded 
50% of the firm’s total sales revenue.
Moreover, although some managers at various levels of authority wanted to emphasise the societal 
health improvement goal of the safe water project, they also recognised (informally and formally) 
that the availability of funds was a key factor that influences decision making (Ishaque, 2020;
Manville and Greatbanks, 2020; Bandura, 1986). Consequently, Mauris experienced less harsh 
conflicts among its organisational members on if and how to combine commercial and societal 
health improvement goals when aiming for organisational survival and legitimacy at the
organisational field level (Mättö et al., 2020; Knardal, 2020; Besharov and Smith, 2014; Pache
and Santos, 2013; Gendron, 2002). Although this finding is consistent with previous PMS research







     
       
      
  
   
  
  
       
     
  
   
  
   
   
      
    
    
  
   
      
   
      
  




     
   
      
   
     
   
    
   
       
     
      
  
      
 
Montauti, 2020; McMullin and Skelcher, 2018; Jenner, 2016; Arena et al., 2015; Nicholls, 2010),
its consequences are far-reaching when it comes to managerial decisions (Ishaque, 2020; Cheng 
and Chu, 2013; Bandura, 1989) to design and operationalise KPIs as key decision-making tools
(Ferry and Eckersley, 2020; Nielsen et al., 2019; Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016). Thus, the severity of
the conflict between institutional logics (McMullin and Skelcher, 2018) in a SE is tempered by its 
need for survival and legitimacy (Mättö et al., 2020), with consequences for the design and 
operationalisation of KPIs to aid managerial decision-making (Busco et al., 2017).
5.2 Designing and implementing KPIs: does the social mission survive?
The main idea here was to insist on Mauris’ pure social mission without paying close attention to 
how the commercial mission of the safe water project would achieve. It became clear to the senior
management team that Mauris could not exclude water consumption data from private household
connections in the KPIs calculation. The juxtaposition of the conflicting commercial and social 
logics illustrates the existence of a moderate intra-organisational conflict (Rozenfeld and Scapens, 
in press) within Mauris since the dominance of commercial logic was overwhelming, but not
absolute (Ferry and Eckersley, 2020; Lepori and Montauti, 2020; Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019;
Busco et al., 2017). This low degree of centrality and compatibility qualifies Mauris as an
estranged organisation in the context of Besharov and Smith (2014). In keeping with Ishaque
(2020), in organisational environments such as Mauris, decision makers require effective cognitive
processing of multidimensional information that contains ambiguities and uncertainties, to identify
managerial rules that enable prediction and exercise of influence over the collective effort 
(Bandura and Jourden, 1991; Bandura, 1986). They argue that this is due to the degree of 
uncertainty resulting from the probabilistic relationship between predictive factors and future
events. Our finding is also consistent with the social cognition view that human decision making
is fragmented (DeCaro et al., 2017), as such decisions are executed by numerous subsystems 
(including herewith different perceptions), which do not collectively work adequately nor
consistently operate effectively (Ishaque, 2020).
The Mauris management’s social cognitive aspirations played an important role in incorporating 
certain KPIs of the internal PMS. Participation in managerial meetings at Mauris enabled us to 
observe what it takes for an organisation to become estranged instead of being dominant. In the 
context of the case firm, it is the survival of the social business status that motivated, and somewhat 
obliged, key operational decision makers, including the managing director, to accept the inclusion 
of private household water consumption data in calculating KPIs related to the firm’s financial 
performance. A similar way of social cognitive thinking prevailed when discussing and deciding
on the inclusion of financial performance data from urban safe water businesses into operational 
and financial KPIs. This further supports the argument in previous PMS literature on analysing 
critical limitations of the social business status of SEs (Nielsen et al., 2019; Gidron, 2017; Voltan 
and De Fuentes, 2016; Dufays and Huybrechts, 2016; Arena et al., 2015) and hybridising 
institutional logics for performance enhancement and budgetary stewardship (Ferry and Eckersley,
2020; Lepori and Montauti, 2020; Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019; Busco et al., 2017; Carlsson-
Wall et al., 2016). It also chimes with the social cognitive argument that in dealing with complex
issues, decision makers often employ heuristics (DeCaro et al., 2017), to simplify and facilitate 








   
      
      
   
    
     
    
   
     
    
   
   
    
       
 
  
   
    
 
  
   
      
     
    
        
    
    
    
   
    
   
    
   
 
 
    
      
  
    
      
   
     
Consequently, Mauris did not become a contested or aligned organisation (Knardal, 2020;
Besharov and Smith, 2014). Given both commercial and social logics did not simultaneously have
high degrees of centrality and compatibility, nor did they have low centrality and high
compatibility, the tension between the two was neither minimal nor extensive. In the social
cognitive sense (Ishaque, 2020; Manville and Greatbanks, 2020; Bandura, 1986, 1989), the
moderate nature of the conflict between commercial and social logics can be partly attributed to 
the efforts of operations managers, including the managing director, to ensure that the firm 
continues to operate as a social business. It is worth noting that from official documents, which
contradict recent PMS literature (Ferry and Eckersley, 2020; Kaufman and Covaleski, 2019; 
Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; McMullin and Skelcher, 2018), Mauris could be mistaken for an
aligned organisation because: first, intra-organisational conflicts are hardly reported in any official
document intended for external disclosure, unless compelled to do so. Second, the official status
of Mauris requires it to combine commercial and social institutional logics, although the required
proportion of each in the combination is not stipulated (Nielsen et al., 2019; Busco et al., 2017;
Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016). In line with Besharov and Smith (2014), we demonstrate the logics 
multiplicity within Mauris in table 1.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Additionally, our analysis identified a moderate level of intra-work conflict regarding the use of 
KPI metrics in determining operational goals in the annual business plan, and how to monitor their
implementation. For instance, although Mauris has societal health assessment metrics for internal 
use, these metrics were not included in the 2017, 2018 and 2019 annual business plans, to set 
operational goals to achieve a certain level of societal health improvement in those years. One
reason for this omission could be financial since it costs money to collect and analyse the relevant
data. A more critical reason is that once a social business has achieved social acceptance and 
political legitimacy, local politicians no longer question its social status but gradually start to press 
for more services at lower prices and lower costs. Mauris could possibly not afford the costs of 
becoming an aligned business and would have kept estranged until the revenue growth from its
rural operations is able to cover the fixed, variable and other costs of the safe water project. This
finding further supports the current view that it is difficult to implement a comprehensive PMS in 
the face of multiple and conflicting institutional logics (Golyagina, 2020; Knardal, 2020; 
McMullin and Skelcher, 2018; Busco et al., 2017; Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016; Gendron, 2002). 
This enhances an understanding of the difficulties facing social businesses in implementing the 
KPIs system (Rozenfeld and Scapens, in press; Ferry and Eckersley, 2020; Manville and
Greatbanks, 2020; Nielsen et al., 2019), especially when operating under difficult financial 
constraints with conflicting logics.
6. Conclusion
This study explores the influence of field-level institutional pressures on the creation and use of a
PMS within a privatised SE in a developing context, which has unique and different institutional
logics from other highly-investigated developing and developed institutional contexts. It answers 
the overarching research question: how does the influence of government, which puts SEs under 
certain resource dependency pressures, contribute to the organisational-level interplay of
commercial and social logics, and then to the internal choice of certain KPIs for SEs’ PMS? 






   
       
      
  
     
       
   
   
    
  
     
    
   
   
      
  
     
        
    
    
      
     
   
     
    
     
    
     
    
       
    
       
 
    
     
  
  
    
   
  
    
      
became financially independent but government funding still has to be obtained through financial 
incentives calculated by KPIs. Two antagonistic logics, such as the social and the economy, created 
internal tensions at the organisational and individual levels. This played a markable role in making
institutional complexity as a mediated political management accounting tool in complex 
organisations (Manville and Greatbanks, 2020; Lepori and Montauti, 2020; Knardal, 2020; Dai et 
al., 2017; Kurunmaki and Miller, 2006) for a better and deeper understanding of how SEs’ PMS
(accounting-based KPIs) is used to gain social acceptance and legitimacy in competing
institutional logics. So far, in contrast to the argument in the existing literature (Rozenfeld and 
Scapens, in press; Ferry and Eckersley, 2020; Golyagina, 2020; Nielsen et al., 2019; Kaufman and 
Covaleski, 2019; Busco et al., 2017; Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016), Mauris achieves this social
acceptance and political legitimacy and, in the hope of management, it will be maintained despite
the clear predominance of commercial over social logics. This contrasts with the literature given
that the relationships between two different logics within Mauris are not fixed, but can change
with changes in the internal and external environment. Therefore, the social logic could gain more
weight if Mauris’ social acceptance and legitimacy got challenged (Mättö et al., 2020). This differs 
with Besharov and Smith (2014) in the fact that logics and their interplay are ‘in a state of flux’ at
three distinct but interrelated institutional levels - field, organisation and individuals.
Drawing on the Besharov and Smith’s (2014) framework of logics multiplicity within
organisations, our research investigated how the process of designing and implementing a PMS
impacts the mission of a SE when analysed through the lens of commercial and social institutional
logics. It analysed the relationships between conceptualising and operationalising the institutional 
complexity in measuring SE performance and factors explaining conflicts and the compatibility of
different institutional logics at the individual, organisational, and organisational field levels in 
shaping the dual mission of SEs. Based on factors influencing centrality in the Besharov and 
Smith’s (2014) framework, our findings show that Mauris could have been an aligned organisation, 
with commercial and social logics being compatible in operational settings as well as in
performance measurement decisions. In practice, however, the factors of the organisational field
and the expertise of the main organisation members at different levels of the hierarchy portray the
enterprise as an estranged organisation. This is because, in Mauris, the commercial logic prevails
but it does not eliminate the social logic, considering the negative consequences on the core
mission and the social status of the organisation that would result from eliminating the social logic.
This is also due to the cognitive processing (Ishaque, 2020; Bandura and Jourden, 1991) by
management (both individually and collectively) that involves cognitive biases resulting from an 
incomplete knowledge (Kahneman, 2003) of social systems and processes (DeCaro et al., 2017;
Cheng and Chu, 2013).
In this setting, institutional field pressures emphasise the financial aspect, but this in the choice of
KPIs, a social logic emerges. This was the Mauris’ political impetus to create a complex PMS
based on financial performance and societal health improvement assessment indicators. However, 
it prioritised the operationalisation of financial performance metrics over social metrics. Unlike 
previous PMS literature, many organisational field factors explain the estranged finding. For 
instance, first, the imperative to operate in profitable urban areas to be able to subsidise rural safe
water operations. Second, including water consumption data from private household water 
connections when calculating financial operational performance of Mauris as a whole. Third, not






       
    
    
    
   
     
 
      
      
       
     
  
     
 
    
     
 
   
   
          
     
     
      
       
        
     
 
     
      
   
       
       
     
   
      
       
    




2019), because Mauris’ strategy was to give priority to short-term financial performance rather
than long-term societal health improvement assessment metrics that are costly to implement.
In the Mauris case, what appeared to be an aligned organisation at the surface level was, in fact,
an estranged organisation from within, because of the well-founded and strong organisational field
and organisational factors (McMullin and Skelcher, 2018; Dai et al., 2017; Dufays and Huybrechts, 
2016; Jenner, 2016). In contrast to previous PMS literature, the dual facet of logic multiplicity
(aligned, but estranged) within Mauris indicates the enterprise’s deviation from the Besharov and
Smith’s (2014) framework. This novel contribution to previous PMS literature on SEs complexity
and institutional logics highlights the difficulties that may be encountered when applying the
theory to the practicalities and particularities of SEs, especially in the institutional context of a
developing country like Egypt. It further supports the current and critical views of Nielsen et al. 
(2019), McMullin and Skelcher (2018) and Ebrahim and Rangan (2014) that the social sector and
the impact of its societal-level institutional logics on the creation and use of KPIs-PMS are still
under-theorised.
This study contributes to the current trend of PMS research on institutional logics through
theorising and analysing factors that explain compatibility and conflicts between institutional 
logics when institutional complexity is employed to set, measure and manage financial and social 
performance (Ferry and Eckersley, 2020; Manville and Greatbanks, 2020; Mättö et al., 2020;
Knardal, 2020; Dai et al., 2017), considering insufficient funds for self-financing social activities. 
Of course, the findings of this single-case study are not generalisable, but still, they may help other
SEs in their design of KPIs, at least to see the problems in it. The case may also help governments 
and regulators when privatising SEs and when drafting laws and making funding schemes for SEs.
We acknowledge that, given the political turbulence and the politically sensitive SEs in Egypt,
there were empirical limitations on data collection. These limitations were to some extent a
hindrance to a broader application of other related aspects. These pave the way towards future
research trends to address these aspects, including the influence of SEs’ workers origin and
characteristics on the interplay of commercial and social logics as well as the choice of KPIs.
Potential future research can also investigate factors indicating that SEs can be thought of as 
belonging simultaneously to two or more types of institutional logics clusters, and propose a theory
to support such a plurality. Another potential research could investigate the possibility of applying 
KPIs-PMS in SEs without funding constraints or accountability pressures imposed by the state
government. Also, given the interpretive case study approach to this study, cultural, contextual,
and institutional differences may limit the application of its findings and interpretations in other
SEs or in other settings but point nevertheless to make recommendations for further comparative
and critical case studies in different SEs and different settings. Another future research could be
‘hybridity’, which is quite a trendy topic in management studies literature and appears to be a
potential accounting/PMS research on hybridity, especially that SEs face conflicts between two 
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(Logics provide compatible prescriptions for action)
Low




















































In theory, based on Mauris’ mission:
Cohabitation/coexistence of commercial and social logics with
almost equal importance


































































Not applicable to Mauris
However, in practice:
Commercial logic prevails over social logic
Social logic is not eliminated because it is the core mission of the
enterprise and helps to maintain and legitimise its social status
Table 1: Types of logics multiplicity within Mauris (Source: Adapted from Besharov and Smith, 2014, p.373)
Note: This table illustrates the high centrality and low compatibility of logics multiplicity within Mauris

